Every Electrification Decision Assumes the Grid Will Be Ready
Electricity is becoming the foundation for more and more of modern life: electric vehicles, heat pumps, AI data centers, semiconductor manufacturing, residential electrification. Each decision may be reasonable on its own. Together, they place increasing demands on the same electrical system.
This article isn't about whether electrification is good or bad. It's about planning. If society has decided that more of our future will depend on electricity, what assumptions were made about the grid that will support it?
How much reserve capacity should we maintain? Should infrastructure readiness determine the pace of electrification? What incentives encourage utilities to build years before capacity is needed? Should critical electrical infrastructure be financed differently as electricity becomes more central to everyday life?
Most importantly, this conversation asks a broader systems-thinking question:
Are we planning for the future we're trying to build, or assuming the supporting system will simply be ready when we need it?
Part 1: How Did We Get Here?
This article started with a conversation I wasn't expecting.
A client in California told me they needed to replace an aging gas water heater. Normally, that wouldn't be particularly interesting. What caught my attention was the reason. Because of local electrification policies, replacing it with another gas water heater was no longer the preferred option.
One homeowner.
One appliance.
One city.
One policy.
By itself, it seems insignificant. It made me wonder how many similar decisions are occurring across the country. Each one makes sense on its own. Together, they raise a much larger question.
What happens when millions of individually reasonable decisions all increase demand on the same electrical system?
A few days later, I read that PJM—the nation's largest regional grid operator—had implemented emergency measures to help avoid blackouts during a period of extreme electricity demand. Whether that event turns out to be an isolated incident or an early indication of a broader trend remains to be seen.
It reinforced the same question.
Not whether electrification is good. Not whether carbon neutrality is the right goal.
Rather:
Even if carbon neutrality is the objective, are we trying to achieve it faster than the supporting infrastructure can reasonably accommodate?
That's an engineering question.
How Did We Get Here?
Over the past two decades, governments, utilities, businesses, and consumers have increasingly moved toward electrification. The reasoning is straightforward. If electricity can increasingly be generated from lower-carbon sources, then replacing gasoline, natural gas, propane, and other fuels with electricity has the potential to reduce emissions while improving local air quality in many applications.
That doesn't mean every country, state, or city is following the same path. Nor is there a single law requiring the United States to become carbon neutral. Instead, thousands of individual decisions are pushing in a similar direction.
- Electric vehicles.
- Heat pumps.
- Electric water heaters.
- Electrified manufacturing.
- AI data centers.
- Semiconductor fabs.
- Battery plants.
- Electric buses.
- New building codes.
- Utility planning.
- Consumer preferences.
Individually, each decision may be reasonable. Collectively, they all increase demand for one shared system: the electrical grid. What's interesting is that no one sets out saying:
"Let's increase electricity demand by thirty percent."
Instead, the decisions are made one at a time. Encourage electric vehicles. Replace gas water heaters. Install heat pumps. Build another AI data center. Expand semiconductor manufacturing. Construct another battery plant. Each decision is typically evaluated on its own merits. But the electrical grid doesn't experience those decisions separately. It experiences them all at once. To me, that's where systems thinking begins.
The Planning Question
This isn't an article about whether carbon neutrality is right or wrong. Reasonable people disagree about climate policy. What interests me is planning.Suppose electrification is the long-term objective. Another question immediately follows.
Was the electrical system expanded at the same pace as the demand we expected to place upon it?
If not… what should we do?
This isn't a political question. It's the same question an engineer asks before expanding a factory. Or a city planner asks before approving a new subdivision. Or a software architect asks before doubling the number of users.
Can the supporting system accommodate the increased load?
That's a different question from whether the objective itself is worthwhile.
A Marathon Isn't Just About the Finish Line
Imagine deciding to run a marathon. The goal may be admirable. But if your training, nutrition, sleep, and recovery don't match the demands you'll place on your body, determination alone won't make the plan successful. The issue isn't the goal. It's whether you've prepared the system.
Large infrastructure transitions are no different. Electrification changes far more than what powers our cars. It changes the demands placed upon generation.
- Transmission.
- Distribution.
- Transformers.
- Substations.
- Reserve capacity.
- Maintenance.
- Construction.
- Workforce.
The supporting system becomes part of the solution.
Every Electrification Decision Assumes the Grid Will Be Ready
As I continued thinking about this, one idea kept coming back.Every decision to electrify something carries an assumption. That the electrical system will be ready. Replace a gas water heater with an electric one. Encourage electric vehicle adoption. Build another AI data center. Expand semiconductor manufacturing. Construct another battery plant. Individually, none of those decisions are inherently the problem. Each assumes the supporting system will evolve alongside it.
That assumption is what this article is really exploring.
Why Are Data Centers Always the Story?
One thing I found interesting while reading about recent reports on grid reliability is how often data centers become the headline. They're certainly one contributor to increasing electricity demand. They're far from the only one.
Electric vehicles. Heat pumps. Electric water heaters. Semiconductor fabs. Battery manufacturing. Industrial electrification. Population growth.
Each contributes to the overall demand placed on the electrical system. So why does one category become the story while the others often receive much less attention?
I don't know.
Perhaps because AI is already a familiar public topic. Perhaps because data centers represent unusually large, concentrated loads. Perhaps because they're easy to visualize. Or perhaps because they're simply the newest and fastest-growing example.Whatever the reason, I think it's a worthwhile question. The way we frame a problem often shapes the solutions people imagine.
The more interesting question, to me, isn't whether data centers are the problem.
It's what proportion of growing electrical demand comes from data centers compared with transportation, heating, manufacturing, population growth, and other trends.
Understanding the whole system is usually more useful than identifying a single headline.
One System or Many?
Historically, society has relied on multiple energy systems.
- Gasoline.
- Natural gas.
- Electricity.
- Diesel.
- Propane.
- Heating oil.
Each served different purposes. More importantly, they often failed in different ways.
As transportation, heating, water heating, manufacturing, and computing increasingly move toward electricity, more of society begins depending on the same infrastructure. That doesn't automatically make the system less resilient. It changes the consequences when that system is disrupted.
One thing I learned while exploring this topic is that people often say:
"We need to build more electricity."
That isn't really a thing. When most hear that phrase, they picture another power plant. Generation is only one part of the system. Electricity has to be generated. Then transmitted. Then distributed. Then delivered through transmission lines, substations, neighborhood transformers, and local distribution systems.
Every one of those depends on permitting. Engineering. Equipment. Construction. Financing. Maintenance. And a skilled workforce. Any one of those can become the bottleneck. Which means "build more" is much easier to say than it is to accomplish.
That led me to another question.
Historically, having multiple energy systems also provided a form of diversity. Gasoline shortages don't necessarily interrupt electric service. An electrical outage doesn't automatically interrupt natural gas distribution. Different systems fail differently.As more of society depends on electricity, should we also be thinking more about redundancy, reserve capacity, distributed generation, microgrids, and backup systems?
In other words...
What problem does energy diversity solve?
Like many engineering questions, I don't think there's a single right answer. Every design involves trade-offs. Electrification may improve efficiency. It may reduce emissions. It may simplify parts of our energy system. Simplifying one part of a system can also increase dependence on another.
Understanding those trade-offs is part of planning.
Part 2: Planning the Transition
The Evidence
Show me the plan. One question kept coming back to me while writing this article.
What was the plan?
Not the goal - the implementation plan. If governments decided years ago that transportation, heating, water heating, manufacturing, and other sectors would increasingly become electric… then somewhere there should have been a corresponding plan for electricity itself.
→ Generation. Transmission. Distribution. Substations. Transformers. Reserve capacity. Construction timelines. Permitting. Funding. Workforce.
If that planning occurred, I'd genuinely like to see it. How much additional electricity did planners estimate would be needed? What assumptions were made? Did those assumptions include electric vehicles?
Heat pumps?
Residential electrification?
Semiconductor manufacturing?
AI data centers?
An assumption may have been that the electrical system would naturally evolve as demand increased. If so, that assumption is just as important as the plan itself. Engineers document assumptions because assumptions often determine whether a plan succeeds or fails.
Were those additions largely unforeseen?
I don't know.
I think it's one of the most important questions in this discussion. If the objective was known years in advance, then the supporting infrastructure should have been part of the same conversation. None of this proves the electrical grid is unprepared or that electrification is moving too quickly. What it does suggest is that the planning question deserves attention.
When the nation's largest regional grid operator implements emergency measures to maintain reliability during periods of extreme demand, it's reasonable to ask whether those events are isolated—or whether they're early signs of a broader challenge.
Especially when forecasts continue projecting substantial growth in electricity demand over the coming decades. The interesting question isn't whether the system failed. It's whether demand is increasing faster than the infrastructure supporting that demand can realistically be expanded.
That's a question worth investigating.
If That's True, What Are the Options?
Suppose, after examining the evidence, we conclude that demand is indeed growing faster than infrastructure can be expanded.
What then?
I see two broad possibilities.
Option 1: Adjust the Timeline
This doesn't necessarily mean abandoning electrification. It may simply mean allowing some existing technologies to remain in service a little longer.
Gas vehicles.
Gas water heaters.
Natural gas heating.
Hybrid approaches.
Regional flexibility.
Infrastructure takes time to build. Most intuitively understand this approach. If the supporting system isn't ready, don't increase demand faster than it can reasonably accommodate.
One thing worth exploring is whether every form of electrification deserves the same timeline. Some technologies may provide immediate societal benefits. Others may be easier to postpone while infrastructure catches up. Perhaps the transition doesn't need to be treated as one giant switch. Perhaps different sectors could proceed at different speeds depending on infrastructure readiness.
That raises another question.
Should every sector move at the same pace?
Hospitals. Semiconductor manufacturing. Critical communications. Residential water heating. Electric vehicle mandates. Data centers.
They don't all serve the same purpose.
Should they all follow the same timeline?
Option 2: Accelerate the Infrastructure
Suppose slowing the timeline isn't acceptable. Then something else has to accelerate.
Generation. Transmission. Distribution. Transformer manufacturing. Substation construction. Permitting. Workforce development. Capital investment. Reserve capacity. Utility planning. Potentially even how utilities are regulated. That isn't a small undertaking. It's a fundamental acceleration of how society plans, finances, approves, and builds critical infrastructure.
How Much Slower? Or Is That Even the Right Question?
Maybe the better question isn't how much slower.
Maybe it's:
How much flexibility exists in the timeline?
And what should determine that timeline?
Maybe a good question is:
What should determine the pace?
I don't think the answer should be an arbitrary number of years. Nor do I think it should simply be: "As fast as possible.” Perhaps the timeline should be determined by infrastructure readiness rather than by a calendar.
Engineers rarely begin with a completion date and then hope the supporting systems are ready. They establish the requirements first. Can the system support the expected load? Has it been tested? Is there sufficient reserve capacity?
What happens if demand exceeds expectations? Those questions help determine the schedule. Perhaps electrification should work the same way.
Instead of asking:
"Can we replace another million gas vehicles this year?"
we might ask:
"Can the electrical system reliably support another million electric vehicles?"
Instead of asking:
"Should more homes replace gas water heaters with electric ones?"
we might first ask:
"Are generation, transmission, neighborhood transformers, and reserve capacity ready for that additional demand?"
Notice the difference. The first questions begin with the objective. The second begin with the supporting system. That isn't slowing progress. It's sequencing it. One possible approach would be to establish engineering milestones rather than calendar milestones.
For example:
- Has enough new generation been completed or committed?
- Has transmission capacity expanded to support projected demand?
- Are utilities maintaining adequate reserve margins?
- Can transformer manufacturers keep pace with expected demand?
- Have substations and local distribution systems been upgraded?
- Are enough electricians, line workers, and engineers available to build and maintain the system?
If those milestones are met, perhaps the transition accelerates. If they are not, perhaps the pace naturally adjusts until the infrastructure catches up.
That raises another question
If the infrastructure isn't ready, which is easier? To modestly adjust the timeline for electrification? Or to fundamentally change how quickly we permit, finance, regulate, and build electrical infrastructure?
Neither option is free.
One primarily requires patience. The other requires enormous investment and potentially significant changes to how we regulate utilities, finance infrastructure, approve projects, and plan for long-term electrical demand.
To me, this isn't an argument for or against electrification.
It's an argument that the pace of a transition should be determined by the readiness of the system expected to support it—not simply by the date we hope to achieve it.
Planning Ahead or Catching Up?
One thing I kept wondering while writing this article was whether we're still implementing a long-term plan—or whether we're increasingly reacting to constraints as they appear. Those are different ways of managing complex systems. One anticipates future demand. The other responds after demand has already begun exceeding expectations.
Perhaps that's unavoidable. Technology changes. Markets change. Forecasts are never perfect. New demands—such as AI data centers—can emerge faster than expected. But if electrification has been a long-term objective for many years, it's reasonable to ask whether the supporting infrastructure was expected to evolve alongside it—or whether we're now asking it to catch up.
That distinction matters. Planning is proactive. Catching up is reactive. Neither approach is inherently wrong. They often lead to very different decisions, costs, and timelines.
Why Not Simply Build More?
One response to all of this is straightforward.
Why not simply build more electrical infrastructure?
A fair question.
If we know electricity demand is expected to increase over the coming decades, why not begin building the generation, transmission, substations, and reserve capacity needed to support it? At first glance, that seems like the obvious solution.Once you begin looking more closely, another question emerges.
If building more infrastructure is the solution, what has prevented us from doing so?
Is it cost?
Permitting?
Environmental reviews?
Politics?
Utility regulation?
Public opposition?
Workforce shortages?
Something else?
The answer is probably not a single cause. It's likely a combination of many.
That leads to another systems question:
What incentives exist to build capacity years before it is needed?
Utilities are generally expected to provide reliable service while keeping rates affordable. Regulators are expected to protect consumers from paying for unnecessary infrastructure. Consumers understandably don't want to pay higher electric bills today for capacity that may not be needed for another decade.
Those are all reasonable objectives.
That raises another question:
Are consumers actually being protected from higher rates—or simply from paying for infrastructure before it's needed?
Electric rates increase for many reasons: Fuel costs. Storm damage. Deferred maintenance. Financing. Ownership changes. New regulations.
Take New Mexico as one example. PNM's parent company is in the process of being acquired by Blackstone Infrastructure. Regardless of how that transaction ultimately affects customers, it illustrates a broader point. Electric rates can increase for reasons that have little to do with proactively building additional electrical capacity.
So why is proactive infrastructure investment often treated differently? If consumers may eventually pay more either way, perhaps the more important question isn't simply whether rates increase.
It's what those higher rates buy.
Are we paying to build a stronger electrical system before it becomes constrained? Or are we paying to respond after those constraints begin affecting reliability? The answer matters because electrical infrastructure often takes years—or even decades—to plan, permit, finance, and construct.
Which means waiting until demand arrives may already be too late.
Who Should Pay for Critical Infrastructure?
Thinking about utility incentives led me to another question.
We often hear:
"We don't have the money."
I'm not sure that's the whole story. Governments routinely finance projects they determine are important enough
Roads.
Airports.
Water systems.
Schools.
Military facilities.
Rail.
The question isn't whether governments can finance infrastructure.They clearly can. The more interesting question is:
Why is electrical infrastructure being treated differently?
That doesn't automatically mean governments should own or build the electrical grid. If electricity is becoming the foundation for transportation, heating, manufacturing, computing, communications, and much of daily life, it's reasonable to ask whether it should increasingly be viewed as critical infrastructure rather than simply another regulated utility.
That question came to mind when I thought about New Mexico. The state found a way to invest heavily in the Rail Runner commuter rail system. Whether that investment was ultimately worthwhile isn't my point. The point is that governments sometimes determine an infrastructure project is important enough to justify substantial public investment.
What makes the electrical grid different?
If governments are willing to invest billions in transportation infrastructure, should they also consider investing more directly in the infrastructure that increasingly powers transportation? Or should that responsibility continue to rest primarily with investor-owned utilities?
Perhaps the current model is exactly the right one. Perhaps it simply needs different incentives. Or perhaps a future in which electricity powers significantly more of society requires rethinking how we finance, regulate, and expand the grid.
I don't know the answer.
I think it's a question worth asking before electricity becomes even more central to modern life. If electrification is the destination, then the electrical grid is no longer just another utility. It becomes part of the nation's critical infrastructure. That may require us to think differently about who is responsible for building it.
Part 3: Lessons Beyond Electricity
One Decision at a Time
One pattern seems to appear throughout this discussion. We tend to debate each decision independently.
Should we build another data center?
Should we encourage electric vehicles?
Should we require electric water heaters?
Should we expand semiconductor manufacturing?
Should we invest in AI infrastructure?
Each discussion focuses on one decision. The electrical grid doesn't experience those decisions one at a time. It experiences all of them simultaneously.
Perhaps that's the larger lesson. Complex systems aren't shaped by one big decision. They're shaped by thousands of individually reasonable decisions that eventually converge on the same infrastructure. That may be why large transitions often feel so difficult.
No single decision creates the problem.
Together they change the system.
What Problem Are We Actually Solving?
This question appears in many of my articles because I think it's easy to become focused on the objective while overlooking the supporting system. In this case, I don't think the most interesting question is whether electrification is the right goal. Nor do I think it's whether carbon neutrality is achievable.
The more interesting question is whether we've planned for what those goals require. Changing what consumes energy may be easier than changing the infrastructure that delivers it.
Replacing a vehicle is measured in years. Building transmission infrastructure may be measured in decades. Changing a building code can happen almost overnight. Expanding generation, permitting transmission corridors, manufacturing transformers, training line workers, and upgrading substations often cannot.
Those are different timelines.
If they become disconnected, planning becomes part of the problem.
Engineering Isn't Just About Building Things
One thing engineering has taught me is that good systems rarely fail because someone had a bad objective. More often, they struggle because the supporting systems weren't prepared for the demands eventually placed upon them.
That's true in manufacturing.
True in software.
It's true in transportation.
It's true in healthcare.
I suspect it's true for electrical infrastructure as well. Engineering isn't simply deciding where we're going.It's understanding what has to exist before we can reasonably expect to get there.
Planning Is a System Too
The more I explored this topic, the less it seemed to be about electricity. It became a question about planning.
About incentives.
About sequencing.
About resilience.
About how complex systems evolve.
One of the recurring ideas in systems thinking is that every solution changes the system around it. Electrification is no different. As we change how we produce, distribute, and consume energy, we're also changing the demands placed upon the infrastructure that supports it.
That doesn't mean we should stop.
It means we should plan accordingly.
Every Solution Begins with Assumptions
As I worked through this article, I realized it isn't really about electricity. It's about assumptions. Every solution begins with them. Some assumptions are explicit. Many are not.
Perhaps one assumption was that electrical infrastructure would naturally keep pace with electrification. Perhaps another was that markets would respond by building the necessary generation, transmission, and distribution capacity. Perhaps another was that technological advances would arrive before infrastructure constraints became significant.
Those assumptions may all prove correct.
Assumptions deserve to be identified before they're tested by reality.
One of the first things engineers learn is that assumptions aren't something to hide. They're something to document. They become part of the design. They determine the calculations. They influence the schedule. They shape the risks. And when conditions change, they're often the first things engineers revisit.
That made me wonder whether we should approach large societal transitions the same way. Not because assumptions are bad. They're unavoidable. Because assumptions that remain unspoken are difficult to evaluate, challenge, or revise.
Perhaps that's one of the broader lessons here. The discussion isn't simply about whether electrification is the right solution.
It's also about identifying the assumptions that make that solution possible—and asking whether those assumptions still deserve our confidence.
Questions Worth Exploring
I don't pretend to know the right pace for electrification. I don't know what percentage of reserve capacity is ideal. I don't know whether investor-owned utilities remain the best long-term model. I don't know what role governments should play in financing future electrical infrastructure.
Those are questions for engineers, economists, utilities, regulators, policymakers, investors, and the public to explore together.
I do think they're the right questions.
The discussion shouldn't end with:
Should we electrify?
It should continue with:
How should we plan for it?
Who should pay for it?
What incentives encourage long-term resilience?
What trade-offs are we willing to accept?
And perhaps most importantly:
What has to be true for this transition to succeed?
Final Thought
This article isn't really about electricity. Electricity simply provided the case study. The larger lesson is about how we approach complex change. Large systems don't respond to intentions. They respond to incentives. They respond to constraints. They respond to engineering realities.
They respond to planning. Perhaps that's the question I keep coming back to in so many different fields.
Not simply:
What problem are we solving?
It's:
Have we prepared the system needed to solve it?
Every transition depends on more than the destination. It depends on whether the system is ready for the journey.